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RESUMEN
Este artículo examina la situación de los cárteles del transporte naviero
(conferencias) que regularon el transporte migratorio transatlántico del
continente europeo a los Estados Unidos. El objetivo del artículo es identi-
ficar las presiones internas y externas subyacentes a estos acuerdos, así
como las estrategias empleadas para neutralizar estas presiones. El autor
llega a la conclusión de que un acuerdo sobre la división del mercado en
quatos (market shares) era esencial para la eficacia de la Conferencia, que
era al mismo tiempo una forma de integración horizontal que regulaban la
competencia entre las compañías de transporte naviero, así como una inte-
gración vertical para obtener el control sobre la red de agentes transatlán-
ticos de venta de billetes a la emigración. El autor correlaciona también la
eficacia de los acuerdos con las tarifas para emigrantes y los costes de la
migración.
Palabras clave: cárteles de transporte naviero, migración, tarifas para
emigrantes, redes marítimas siglo XIX
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ABSTRACT
This article surveys the situation of the shipping cartels (conferences)
which regulated transatlantic migrant transport from the European
Continent to the United States. The focus of the article is to identify the
internal and external pressures underlying these agreements and the strate-
gies employed to neutralize these pressures. The author reaches the con-
clusion that a pool agreement was essential for the effectiveness of the
Conference, which was both a means of horizontal integration regulating
the competition between shipping companies and a means of vertical inte-
gration to gain control over the transatlantic migrant agent network selling
the ocean passage tickets. The author also correlates the efficiency of the
agreements with steerage fares and migration costs.
Keywords: shipping cartels, migration, steerage fares, maritime net-
works 19th century
JEL Classification: D4, N80, F22, N80
INTRODUCTION
Shipping conferences or rings are collusive agreements to mitigate com-
petition and reduce the effects of trade fluctuations, primarily to regulate
prices and market shares 1. Their origins are generally ascribed to the need
of shipping companies to ease the pressures of destructive competition
which cut prices and profits as a result of overcapacity on certain routes 2.
It is generally agreed that the first shipping conference was the UK-Calcutta
Conference regulating the tea trade established in 1875 3. Yet there are clear
indications that similar agreements were concluded much earlier in the
North Atlantic 4. The practice spread quickly and is still in use today; more
than 150 conferences were operative in 2001 5. Research on shipping rings
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has concentrated on freight transport, yet these did not manage to reverse
the tide of sharply decreasing freight rates throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury 6. As Jeffrey Williamson and Timothy Hatton underlined, this decline
was the main factor behind the convergence of the commodity market befo-
re 1914. At the same time, they highlighted the importance of migration in
the development of the Atlantic economy 7. We know little, however, about
the price formation of transatlantic passenger fares. Drew Keeling and
Knick Harley’s reconstructions of yearly averages for the Cunard Line show
that, unlike freight rates, passenger fares increased 8.
This article sheds more light on why passenger fares rose by analyzing the
formation of third class migrant rates through conference agreements betwe-
en four Continental lines; Holland America Line (HAL) Red Star Line (RSL),
North German Lloyd (NGL) and Hamburg America Line (HAPAG) for the
period 1885-1895. So far, Erik Murken’s research on the pool agreement bet-
ween these lines, the «Nord-Atlantischer Dampfer-Linien Verband» (NDLV),
established in 1892, remains the only substantial research of shipping rings
regulating passenger trade. Subsequently, the NDLV made arrangements with
other companies and conferences which, by 1914, had become a horizontal
alliance including twelve separate agreements between 30 lines carrying pas-
sengers on the North Atlantic route 9. This article analyzes the growing pains
of the conference system which preceded the pool agreements and its impact
on transatlantic migrant fares, applying Osborne’s cartel formation model and
reconstructing the external and internal pressures on the agreements. As also
underlined by Stigler, the key to the success of a cartel depended on the abi-
lity of its members to detect and deter cheating on the agreements. This was
also the main obstacle faced by the continental lines in the search for a wor-
kable equilibrium 10. Since these passenger agreements were complex, mea-
ning that firms colluded on variables other than price, such as delimitating the
members’ territory or coordinating sailing schedules, the incentives to cheat
were stronger than a simple price agreement and hence the importance of fin-
ding efficient means to monitor the conference increased 11. In the case of pas-
senger conferences many clauses dealt with the coordination of the wide net-
work of migrant agents or brokers and the regulation of their sales of ocean
passage tickets. As will be argued for the American market of ocean passage
sales, the lack of control over this network made any price agreements void.
The research is based on the minutes of the Continental Conference in
New York and on the correspondence between the head-agent in New York,
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W. H. Van den Toorn, and the board of directors of the HAL. It reveals how
the company organized the booming markets of eastbound tickets for
return or repeat migrants, reaching 30 per cent of the westbound movement
by the turn of the century and prepaid tickets sold in the US for passengers
to make the crossing from Europe, which for the HAL represented 50 per
cent of its westbound business 12. The minutes give further detail on ways in
which the conference tried to neutralize internal and external competition
and contains the dates when members adapted their third class fares. The
correspondence between the head-agent and the board of directors, which
gives an inside view of the organization of passenger business, is even more
revealing. Since most of the decisions of the New York Continental
Conference required the approval of the directors and depended on parallel
conference agreements regulating the European cash business, an intense
correspondence was generated. Like the work of Genesove and Mullin on
the sugar cartel, the correspondence provides insights into the reasoning
behind the firm’s actions and what was significant during the negotiations
to reach an agreement 13.
1. THE HOLLAND AMERICA LINE AND THE ORGANIZATION
OF OCEAN PASSAGE SALES
Gordon Boyce underlined the co-operative dimension of shipping confe-
rences, its importance in shaping relations between shipping companies
and between shippers and shipowners and criticized economists for focu-
sing on market power and the cost/service driven necessity of conference
regulation 14. The main difference between the shipment of cargo and that
of migrants is that the former is supplied by shippers in the port while the
latter is provided by a wide network of migrant brokers, agents and sub-
agents spread on both sides of the Atlantic. Models explaining the viability
of conferences are based upon a common interest between shippers and
ship owners 15. Conversely, between ship-owners and the various layers of
middlemen; migrant brokers, agents and sub-agents, this common interest
hardly existed. These go-betweens worked on a commission basis for diffe-
rent lines. Commissions increased when competition among shipping com-
panies intensified and therefore agents had few reasons to favor a stable
market. To increase their profits, shipping companies needed to find ways
to tighten their grip on the agents.
The HAL offers a representative example of how passenger lines organi-
zed their sales. Founded during the steamship boom of the early 1870s when
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the transition from sail to steam on the North Atlantic passenger market
took place, the HAL appointed migrant brokers who managed the passage
business for the company on both sides of the Atlantic; Van Es, Wambersie
& Ruys in Rotterdam for the «European cash business» and Morris & Co in
New York for the «eastbound and prepaid markets». As early as 1877 the
HAL decided to change this situation and took the European passenger busi-
ness into its own hands becoming responsible for a vast agent-network
which rapidly numbered more than two thousand members 16. In New York,
Morris & Co supervised a nationwide network totaling one thousand four
hundred members. Most agents also had another main job and some were
innkeepers, priests, hotel-owners, notaries, insurers, bankers, mine-owners,
railroad employees, newspaper-editors, storekeepers, etc. In the US, migrant
entrepreneurs usually combined several such occupations, yet banking and
the sale of ocean passage tickets were essential features of their business.
Sharing ethnic ties with migrants allowed these entrepreneurs to gain the
trust of new arrivals who often relied on them for housing, jobs and legal
documents, but above all to assist them with their savings which became the
primary goal of the move as transatlantic migration became less permanent
with the introduction of steam. Migrants used short term target accumula-
tion as part of their migration strategy; saving towards a remittance or ste-
amship tickets to go back home or have family and friends join them 17. The
sale of ocean passages allowed migrant entrepreneurs to earn a commission,
but above all it made it possible for them to contact potential laborers or
clients for other businesses. Steamship companies provided them with rate
and time table sheets, advertising materials and ticket books but generally
failed to generate enough business for one agent to impose the exclusivity of
sales. Migrant entrepreneurs, on the other hand, tried to work with as many
shipping companies as possible to boost their prestige and increase their
business. To retain the agency, agents needed to spread their sales between
the companies represented, yet the shipping company offering the best faci-
lities and the highest commission was likely to get most of the business.
When selling a prepaid ticket, the intended passenger was given one year
to make the crossing. The agent contacted the migrant broker with infor-
mation about the passenger and the ticket number. The migrant broker, in
this case Morris & Co, then arranged for the transport with the HAL. The
passenger could rely on the assistance of agents in his home region and at
major transit points to forward him to the port of departure. Through this
network, companies could arrange for this to be done according to the sai-
ling dates, minimizing the time spent at the port and cutting down on the
extra costs for the passenger. Prepaid ocean passages were generally sold
together with railroad tickets to the port of embarkation and from the port
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of arrival to the final destination, on which migrant agents earned an extra
commission. In 1885 the Dutch company ended its association with Morris
& Sons. These steps towards vertical integration allowed the company to
cut down on the commission paid to Morris, but more importantly, allowed
them to increase the control over the migrant agents by dealing with them
directly. Subsequently the company opened its own agencies at key transit
points on both sides of the Atlantic 18. However, HAL’s success depended lar-
gely on the simultaneous attempts made by the steam-shipping companies
to form durable and effective horizontal alliances. These were as much a
matter of gaining control over the transatlantic agent-network as a means
of neutralizing competition between shipping companies.
Keeling pointed out that the incentives for cartelization in migrant trans-
port proved to be stronger than in the case of freight transport because the
underlying demand was both more sensitive to economic swings and less
dependent on transport prices. Economic downturns had bigger impacts on
migrant flows than on freight movements 19. The first conference regulating
part of the American prepaid and return ticket market goes back to 1872
with the establishment of the New York North Atlantic Steam Traffic
Conference. The agreement between British lines, which dominated the
market at the time, covered the regulation of the agent network and trans-
port prices. It also needed to fend off growing continental competition,
especially from HAPAG and NGL which managed to threaten British domi-
nance. After the American Civil War many new lines of various nationalities
were founded, yet they never caught up with the biggest German and
British firms which dominated the market. Competitors for the trade orga-
nized themselves around this rivalry. To strengthen their competitive posi-
tion the German companies tried to unite lines transporting migrants
directly from the European mainland to the US in a similar fashion to their
British rivals. The first lasting Continental Conference was established in
1885. The conference in New York was the result of a parallel agreement
signed by the directors of the companies to regulate the business in Europe.
The New York sub-conference was thus dependent on the agreements in
Europe. The HAPAG, NGL, RSL and HAL had already tried to join forces in
1883, but direct outside competition from the Carr Line in Hamburg and
the White Cross Line in Antwerp meant that the agreement lasted a few
months only 20. Under the pressure of subsequent dropping migration rates,
the British North Atlantic Steam Traffic Conference also folded 21. A general
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rate war broke out making prepaid prices fall from at least $18, depending
on the line and the service, to anywhere between $6 and $12, meaning at
cost or at a loss 22.
After long negotiations, while HAPAG and RSL took measures to neu-
tralize the competition in their home ports, the Continental Conference
reorganized in May 1885 23. The agreement included minimum rates to New
York based on the quality of service (see Figure 1). The HAL, running the
oldest and slowest steamers, obtained differentials to their advantage. The
RSL service to Philadelphia and the NGL service to Baltimore were also
included in the agreement. Rates were lower on these less popular routes
and fares could only be changed if the differentials were maintained. The
prices quoted were gross ocean fares, including commissions. Charges for
overland travel could not be included and rate sheets of continental over-
land fares had to be sent to the secretary. The New York representatives held
monthly meetings at which decisions required unanimous support. The
agent commission was set at $3, covering all expenses except advertising in
newspapers. A General Passage Agent for the Pacific coast, Western States
and Southern States was appointed who had to defend the company inte-
rests in these regions and supervise the local agents. They could only repre-
sent one company, but in exchange received a commission of one dollar on
each ticket sold by an agent in their area. The cancellation fee for a ticket
was set at five percent. Advertisements could not contain comparisons with
services offered by members of the conference. The companies also agreed
to withdraw advertisements from any newspaper that attacked a member.
Every breach was reported to the Secretary who, if necessary, passed on the
complaint to an Arbitrator. The latter was empowered to look into the books
of the companies and his decision was final. To ensure commitment to the
agreement, the lines deposited a bond. The agreement was valid for six
months and withdrawal was possible with one month’s notice 24.
A circular was sent to the agents notifying them of the conference regu-
lations. No returns or divisions of the commission could be given, nor could
improper inducements be offered to purchasers of tickets. Agents were nei-
ther allowed to engage sub-agents or runners, nor to share commissions
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with third parties. The actual amount received for the passage had to be sta-
ted on the ticket and no credit could be given to the purchaser. Shipping
companies only paid commission on the actual issue of the ticket and the
direct receipt by the agents of the passage money. Agents were not allowed
to issue certificates, orders or tickets for prepaid passage drawn on any per-
son or company other than the lines actually employing such agent. The
selling of tickets was restricted to a certain area which prevented agents
from invading each other’s territory. Violations of other agents had to be
reported, with evidence, to the secretary. The punishment depended on the
infraction and could vary from a minimum fine equal to the price of the tic-
ket to the disqualification of the agent. Agents who did not comply with the
agreements would be disqualified and lines agreed not to re-engage any dis-
missed agents. On paper the agreement looked very promising, in practice
it would prove very difficult to implement.
2. THE WORKING OF THE CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE UNTIL
THE FORMATION OF THE NDLV
The evolution of ocean rates serves as a good indicator of the cartel’s suc-
cess. To what extent were the companies able to raise prices? To what extent
did they overcome external and internal pressures? Applying Osborne’s
model to this case, the external problem can be reduced to the ability of the
lines to predict and limit the market share of outsiders to keep the agree-
ments viable. Internal problems consisted firstly of finding a workable and
profitable contract; secondly of making sure that the agreement generated
the expected shares for each member and thirdly the ability to detect and
deter cheating. For both Osborne and Stigler, the detection of cheating
plays a crucial role in collusion. Secret violations of the agreement, espe-
cially in the form of price cuts, gave shipping lines the possibility to incre-
ase their market share. According to Stigler, if the means of detection were
weak, prices could not rise much above the competitive level. The basic
method of detection was to note when price cutters were obtaining business
which a line did not otherwise obtain 25. Information on the market share of
each line was readily available as American ports registered all incoming
third class passengers. Fluctuation in sales of migrant agents in certain
regions also served as a barometer. Yet the biggest problem was to prove
that lines obtained the increased share by cheating. The next section con-
sists of an analysis of the external and internal pressures during the first
seven years of the cartel until the division of the market into shares with the
formation of the NDLV.
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2.1. Harmonizing the external pressures
The connections between British-Scandinavian, Continental
and Mediterranean markets
The external pressures on the conference were considerable. The
European migrant market was divided into three sub-markets; the British-
Scandinavian, the Continental and the Mediterranean (see Appendix 1). The
British-Scandinavian market was predominantly in the hands of the British
lines. The British Board of Trade imposed extensive controls on Continental
ships which meant that these vessels were not permitted to transport British
and Irish migrants from the Isles on the westbound voyage 26. This internal
market represented the majority of the revenues of the British lines, which
had a strong foothold in the Scandinavian market through well established
feeder services, such as the Hull-based Wilson Line 27. Despite the geogra-
phical advantage and continuous efforts of the German lines and the
Copenhagen-based Thingvalia Line to increase their market share, the
majority of Scandinavians preferred to travel on British ships. Attempts to
convince British and Irish migrants to emigrate from continental ports
were even less successful. Conversely, the British lines had always been able
to attract continental passengers to travel indirectly through British ports.
The strong trade relations between Hamburg and England during the early
years of mass migration transformed Hamburg into the most important
hub for indirect transatlantic migration 28. The ties between migrant bro-
kers and agents in Liverpool and Hamburg were well established and insti-
tutionalized by British and Hamburg Senate laws 29. These ties constituted
the Achilles heel of the Continental Conference. Although continental traf-
fic only represented a small percentage of the total business of British lines,
it allowed them to exert constant pressure on the continental lines which
were, to a large extent, dependent on the goodwill of the British lines to
raise their prices or lower commissions for continental traffic 30. The
TORSTEN FEYS
182
31 De Vannoise-Pochulu (1993, pp. 10-17).
32 GAR, HAL, 318.02, 112, Letter January 16 1886 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, May 25 1885,
minute 41.
government protection of their internal market, as long as they had a foo-
thold on the continent, gave the British lines the edge over their Continental
rivals.
The Mediterranean market, which at the time was starting to grow, con-
sisted mainly of Italians. Some companies, such as the Fabre and Italian
Line, opened a direct service to New York. Other British and Continental
lines also tried to lure Italians to their ports. In particular, the French line,
Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (CGT), which drew migrants mainly
from South-West Germany and Switzerland with special railroad services,
saw the Italian market as the most natural territory for expansion 31. The
company increasingly centered its efforts on the Mediterranean and
Oriental markets which boomed later in the mid 1890s leading to the ope-
ning of new direct services. At one of the first meetings of the Continental
Conference it was decided that direct and indirect lines should try to unite
in a Mediterranean conference to fix through rates for this region 32. In the
same year, RSL and HAL took the initiative to form the Mediterranean
Conference with the Fabre and Italian Line. If rates for Italian destinations
differed significantly from continental ones, Swiss and Austrian migrants
might choose them instead of using continental ports. If Scandinavian rates
were lower than continental rates, Germans and Poles would be booked at
the lowest price. If the rate difference between the continent and the British
Isles was too large, migrants from the continent would travel to Liverpool,
which offered frequent services to many continental destinations. In short,
the different conferences were dependent on each other to increase rates
jointly.
Outside rivals on the Continent: Thingvalia and French Line
The Continental market ranged from Spain to Russia and was in full
expansion to the east at the time. The Continental Conference had been
drawn up to include both Thingvalia Line and CGT. The Danish line focused
on the Scandinavian market but the location of Copenhagen allowed them to
target the continental market easily. However, the Danes could not be con-
vinced to join the conference. The non inclusion of the CGT had greater
repercussions on the working of the conference. Having, to a great extent, the
same hinterland as the members of the conference, they could not fix rates
and commissions that differed much from the CGT without risking the loss
of a share of the traffic. Moreover, the British lines required that the CGT be
included in the conference in order to raise rates jointly. After months of futi-
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le negotiations, the Continental lines increased ocean rates by $2.5 while
taking measures to force the CGT to join the conference. The conference
members did not use so called «fighting ships», a practice consisting of
announcing special sailings at drastically reduced rates whenever an outside
line scheduled a departure 33. Neither did they cut the ocean rate affecting all
continental business. Instead they cut railroad rates to popular destinations
of the French line’s traveling public. The lines also matched the CGT’s incre-
ased commission of $4 on eastbound tickets. Furthermore, agents were noti-
fied that unless they relinquished the agency of the French line, ticket books
of the Conference lines would be withdrawn from them 34. This forced the
CGT to rely on the disreputable yet very active parallel network of non-con-
ference agents. The British lines also helped to put pressure on the French to
enter the conference through the agent network 35. Negotiations resumed and
the CGT entered after reaching an agreement with the RSL and HAL regar-
ding through rates, including the railroad fare to points in Switzerland,
France and Northern Italy. This cleared the path to enter further negotiations
with the British lines on rates and agent regulations.
The network of migrant brokers and agents: the concentration in New York
One of the priorities of the Continental Conference was to impose «city
rules» in New York. European migrant brokers and agents had to apply to
the authorities for a concession which was obtained after depositing a
bond. European laws assisted their shipping companies to gain control over
the migrant agents. In the US no laws regulating ocean passage sales exis-
ted. The agent network was left to the sole supervision of the passenger
lines. On the American market most ocean passage tickets were sold in the
city, where chaos reigned because of the proliferation of agents and run-
ners 36. Innkeepers, boardinghouses, peddlers, etc. sold tickets over the
counter which they obtained from migrant agents. With «city rules» the
lines wanted to do away with the middleman and restrict the sale of ocean
tickets in New York to the company’s office. This would greatly increase the
control over the business and eliminate commission costs. However, to
achieve this without important losses of market share, all the lines had to
adhere to the system. Once the British reached their provisional agreement,
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the members of the Continental Conference greatly reduced the number of
agents in the city. However, they awaited the collaboration of the other lines
to move forward into the market and take over sales in the city 37.
The lines also wanted to counter the developing system of orders with
the «city rules». European cash rates were inferior to American prepaid
rates, while the agent’s commission was higher in Europe making the net
ocean fare in Europe significantly lower 38. Midway through the 1880s some
American agents started selling their own orders for steerage passage drawn
on European agencies at cash rates, allowing them to undercut the conti-
nental prepaid rate by up to $4. These orders were then exchanged for
European cash rate tickets of the shipping companies by the agency in
Europe. This practice started in Hamburg where British lines stimulated
the order system to increase their continental market share. HAPAG infor-
med conference members that unless the British lines could be forced to
raise the European cash rates, they would have to break up the prepaid rate
agreement to meet said competition 39. The German line opened a low cost
New York-Baltic service to and from Copenhagen, Göteborg and Stettin to
put pressure on the British lines, while in the meantime it negotiated with
the migrant brokers in Hamburg 40. By the end of 1886 the British lines,
HAPAG and Hamburg migrant brokers had reached an agreement. The
German line withdrew its direct Scandinavian line while the British lines
agreed to limit their share of the traffic going through Hamburg to 35 per-
cent. The price difference between indirect and direct routes could not exce-
ed five Marks to the advantage of the British lines. A Clearing House was set
up to control traffic through Hamburg 41.
Although an agreement was reached that agents of all three conferences
could make bookings for all members excluding outside lines, the distrust
between the German and British lines remained, impeding the imposition
of city rules and a significant price rise. The payment of secret extra com-
missions persisted 42. When, at the beginning of 1888, tensions seemed to be
under control as the commission was jointly lowered to $2, price changes
were mutually discussed by the conferences and the imposition of «city
rules» was considered, the Mediterranean Conference fell apart. The
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43 Ibid., October 25 1887, minute 77; January 31 1888, minute 165; October 2 1891, minute
370, GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letters January 3, 20 1888; September 10, October 3, 17 and Novem-
ber 19 1890.
44 Ibid., July 16 1889, minute 165; October 2, minute 370; December 2, minutes 375-379;
December 23 1890, minute 382 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221- 222; Letters October 11, 15 1889;
January 21 1890 and December 10 1891.
45 Only once, in 1889, were agreements renewed for a year. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letter
December 11 1889.
46 Between 1886 and 1889 the HAL bought seven second-hand ships, totaling 27.000 tons.
47 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, December 11 1888, minute 214; June 13 1889, minute 273. Even-
tually the HAL gave in and agreed to reduce the rate differential with the RSL by 50 cents. GAR,
HAL, 318.04, 221 Letter October 11 1889.
Arbitrator found RSL guilty of cutting rates and giving special incentives to
agents, upon which the Fabre and Italian Line decided to leave the
Mediterranean Conference. The interference of the Italian government,
which passed laws aimed at directing traffic through national ports, hinde-
red renegotiations. It also put an end to plans to pool the Mediterranean
market and open joint offices in New York where all lines would have been
represented by an independent agent whose books would have been acces-
sible to members at all times 43. Subsequently, the agreement between the
British lines was also discontinued due to internal tensions leading to a rate
war on the British-Scandinavian market. The Continental lines managed to
prevent rate wars from spreading to the continent but could not prevent
them from bringing down rates 44.
2.2. The internal pressures
Internal distrust, duration of agreements and constant renegotiations
Distrust between members who for a long time had seen each other as
their main rivals constantly weighed on the Continental Conference. The
underlying suspicions are reflected in the duration of the agreements.
During the first five years, agreements were never renewed for longer than
seven months 45. Sometimes the negotiations to renew an agreement, during
which the old agreement usually continued, took longer than the duration
of the agreement itself. With fixed prices the competition between the lines
moved increasingly towards the quality of service. During the first five
years, the HAL in particular greatly improved its fleet 46. As differentials bet-
ween lines were based on quality of service, they were subject to constant
renegotiations. The RSL insisted that initial differentials should be adapted
accordingly 47. These tensions quickly led the conference into its first crisis
less than a year after its creation.
Failing to obtain its expected market share, the RSL refused to renew the
agreement triggering a rate war in which prepaid fares plummeted by $10.
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48 Ibid., 563, July 26, minute 258, August 2 1886, minutes 265-269 and ibid., 767, Circular
to agents August 3 1886.
49 In 1890, rates from Baltimore to the West were, on average, $1.94 cheaper than from New
York. Tickets from Philadelphia cost on average $1.24 less than from New York. Ibid. 221, Letter,
December 20 1890.
The HAL reacted by notifying its agents that it would meet any new reduc-
tion of the RSL to maintain the rate differential it had before the rate war.
Conference agents were at liberty to dispose of their commission as they
saw fit, yet had to stop selling RSL tickets or send back the ticket books of
the Conference lines. The limit on the number of agents in New York was
lifted 48. This rate war to force RSL back into the fold lasted eight months
during which agents were allowed to disregard many regulations. When
they were caught violating the rules still in force, fines were lower. Agents
caught selling tickets for the RSL first received a warning before being dis-
qualified, to prevent as many agents as possible from giving up the confe-
rence agency. With the new agreement, a circular was sent to remind agents
of the regulations and add some new ones. These included the increase of
cancellation fees to ten percent and the replacement of fixed commissions
with commissions of ten percent of the price of the ticket. The latter could
have moved agents and ship-owners towards a common interest in raising
prices. Yet the small lines feared that the percentage basis would stimulate
the sale of the more expensive services of the bigger lines. Their protests
eventually led to the reintroduction of fixed commissions. This was only one
disadvantage of the lack of product homogeneity.
The lack of product homogeneity: various services, destinations
at different rates
The working of the cartel was further complicated because some lines
offered slow and fast services and also to different ports of arrival such as,
Baltimore, Philadelphia and New York at different rates. Negotiations con-
cerning whether to include new services added to the internal tensions. For
example, the HAL opened a Baltimore service because of its cheaper railro-
ad rates to and from the West, the more lenient implementation of immi-
gration laws and to fight the increasing competition for freight between
Rotterdam and the US 49. Yet the Dutch line was also the only company with
just one destination and no variety in standard of service. It was a well
known practice for companies to book passengers for a regular service to be
transported on express steamers, or passengers were booked at lower
Philadelphia and Baltimore rates but landed in New York. Although this was
against the conference rules, it was very difficult to prove such abuses.
Companies gave these facilities to their most reliable agents who, to avoid
fines and possible disqualification, operated in the utmost secrecy. As pas-
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50 At some stage the HAL had to hire an extra bookkeeper to cover up the violations of the
agreements. Ibid., 222, Letter August 21 1891.
51 Ibid., 222, Letters March 17, June 12, July 22 and September 25 1891.
52 See Feys (2007p: 245-272). The appointment of a special committee to put an end to rate
cuts on railroad tickets sold in connection with eastbound ocean passage shows that the pro-
blem persisted. Ibid, 563, December 22, 30 1890, minute 384, 390.
sengers were very reluctant to give affidavits regarding fraud, the lines hired
private detectives when they suspected a member of evading the regulations
on a large scale. They pretended to be clients yet all kinds of tricks were used
to prevent them from getting their hands on evidence 50. To prove cheating
with upgraded services, the detectives had to actually travel on these tickets.
Whenever the violations of the agreement were too difficult to prove, the
Dutch line made sure to be able to tamper with them as well, explaining the
opening of the Baltimore service. The NGL, which practically monopolized
passenger traffic in Baltimore, radically opposed the inclusion of the new
service in conference agreements. In theory it meant that conference agents
were not allowed to book for the HAL’s Baltimore service. In practice, by
paying extra commission the HAL found many agents willing to take the
risk of being fined or disqualified, since they had means to prevent other
lines from obtaining proof of the violation. Not having to comply with con-
ference rules permitted the HAL to undercut NGL rates significantly and
pay higher commissions thus attracting a fair share of passengers 51.
Agreements on ocean rates intensified the competition on railroad rates
Fixed ocean rates intensified competition on railroad rates as rail travel
and ocean passages were often sold together. The differentials on ocean
rates, resulting from tough negotiations, could easily be cancelled out by
railroad fares. Trying to fix through rates, the conference secretary required
the lines to hand in lists of actual overland fares obtained from transport
companies on both sides of the Atlantic. Any cut in these rates was consi-
dered a conference violation yet, once again, it was very difficult to provide
evidence of this. The lines constantly negotiated with railroads to obtain
special rates in exchange for their business. On American soil the lines used
the keen competition between the railroads to obtain all kinds of reduc-
tions. Yet, with the establishment of the Immigrant Clearing House, coor-
dinating the immigrant railroad transport, in 1887, the railroads increased
their rates and cut the commissions granted on railroad tickets sold in con-
nection with ocean passages. Special reductions persisted, yet these were
far less significant 52.
European overland tariffs caused greater instability. The HAL’s low over-
land tariff had a particularly demoralizing effect. The Dutch railway and the
Rhine steamboat companies reduced their fares in 1887 giving the HAL an
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53 Ibid., May 31, minute 32; November 17, minute 87; December 27 1887, minute 104; January
31, minute 109; April 24, minute 143; July 2 1888, minutes 174-176.
54 Ibid., January 22 1889, minute 224 and GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letters June 16 and 22
1888.
55 Ibid., June 27 1889, minute 272-276; February 27, minute 329; December 30 1890, minute
390; May 21, minute 432; July 1 1891, minute 449.
56 Unfortunately no price series of European cash rates is available but additional commis-
sions and the price difference must have been around $4 to $5, based on the repeated calls of
the agents to raise the cash rate by ten to fifteen Marks or cut prepaid rates by $2 to $3. In 1889
the CGT was still urging for a reduction on prepaid rates of $3.5 despite a previous rise of the
cash rate by 10 Marks. In 1890 the gap between net prices was further reduced still leaving a
difference of $2.9; the cash rate being 60 Marks, which at the contemporary exchange rate used
by the companies of 4.2 Marks to the dollar brings it to $14.1 while the prepaid net rate was $17
or 72.1 Marks. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221-223, Letters of Van den Toorn and ibid., 563, October 25
1887, minute 72; February 28, minute 127; June 16 1888, minute 165; meetings March 10; April
10; May 2 and 10 1890.
important differential on overland transport. The other members questio-
ned the validity of these rates and brought the case to the arbitrator. While
awaiting his decision, members ignored the rule which required lines to
quote the actual overland tariff and offered HAL’s rates. Tensions increased
when the arbitrator ruled in favor of the HAL and the RSL refused to stop
using the HAL tariff 53. The Dutch line attributed the low rates to the geo-
graphical advantage of Rotterdam which it was not prepared to give up.
After long negotiations, the companies reached a compromise, reducing the
differential on ocean rates between lines 54. Even with this arrangement, the
CGT calculated that the average differential, including railroad and ocean
rates, at thirty five popular locations in Europe amounted to $9.25 in favor
of RSL and $11.35 in favor of HAL. To prevent the French line from leaving
the conference, the HAL and RSL reduced differentials on through rates to
French, Swiss and Northern Italian destinations to $2. A special sub-com-
mittee was formed to tackle the problems of European overland fares by
establishing a list of a maximum of 300 points where passengers could be
booked through at fixed rates 55.
The takeover of the prepaid market by migrant brokers
The most important internal pressure was the competition between lines
to obtain passengers from the migrant brokers by giving them special faci-
lities. This allowed the predominantly Jewish entrepreneurs to completely
corrupt the prepaid market out of Hamburg through their own orders with
the line’s consent. The pool agreement for the Hamburg traffic between
HAPAG and the British lines did not put an end to the practice. The diffe-
rence in price between the net cash and prepaid rates was between $4 and
$5. After repeated requests from New York head-agents, the gap was redu-
ced to $2.5 56. Yet this still offered enough margin for Hamburg migrant bro-
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57 Ibid.
58 RSL and HAL, the former eternal rivals, joined forces to strengthen their negotiating posi-
tion against the German line. On the admission of the pool, lines had to stop giving extra com-
kers, who in the meantime had opened branch offices in New York, to
undercut the prepaid rate. Although it was against the conference rules, it
was a public secret that the HAPAG reached special arrangements with
some brokers using their own orders to counter the competition of the
British lines in its home port. Because of this rivalry, the practice spread
quickly and other Continental lines made arrangements through branch
offices in New York to get their hands on the order business. Instead of
imposing «city rules» and closing the gap between shipping companies and
clients, the discord between lines allowed these brokers to take control of
ocean passage sales. They drove migrant agents selling regular prepaid tic-
kets out of business. Therefore many agents started selling the brokers’
orders instead of regular tickets. When caught cheating, offenders paid the
fine, protesting against the pending disqualification for a subsequent offen-
ce and claiming that the conference gave no protection to regular business.
By 1889, the CGT, which because of its orientation towards the
Mediterranean market did not have the same connections with Jewish
migrant brokers who initially specialized in the Eastern European market,
saw its continental prepaid sales come to a standstill 57.
During the next eight months, lines renegotiated the agreements allo-
wing Jewish brokers to increase their grip on the market. The order busi-
ness spread to Baltimore, Philadelphia, Chicago, Saint Louis and
Milwaukee. Because of the restrictions of the Hamburg pool, brokers ope-
ned branch offices in Bremen, Rotterdam and Antwerp to expand their
business. Migrant brokers, such as L. Scharlach for the HAL, F. Missler for
NGL and S. Jarmulowsky for the RSL, obtained control over the prepaid
business. To increase their market share the companies gave all sorts of
facilities in violation of conference agreements, ranging from cheating with
upgraded service, to not charging cancellation fees, paying extra commis-
sion, allowing the change of names on the ticket, hiring subagents, dividing
the commission or offering part of it as a reduction to the buyer. The
Hamburg pool, created to control indirect migration through the port, boo-
meranged with the opening of new indirect routes, increasing tensions bet-
ween continental members and with British lines. Much to the dislike of the
HAPAG, the RSL and HAL had to be included in the Hamburg pool to pre-
vent the abuses from escalating. The HAPAG saw its share of the traffic
through its home port further reduce. Tensions between HAPAG and HAL
accumulated to the extent that both made preparations to let their ships go
through each other’s home port. Conference agreements failed to provide
the desired stability and unless members found a new arrangement, a gene-
ral rate war seemed unavoidable 58.
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mission to their Hamburg agency but were assured a fixed number of passengers or compen-
sation if the number was not reached. As Van den Toorn observed, the number of passengers
would decrease but they would be booked at a better price. Moreover the Hamburg pool was an
excellent means of putting Ballin under pressure during negotiations. With the agreement HAPAG
saw its share of the traffic through Hamburg decrease from 65 per cent to 57,8 per cent. GAR,
HAL, 318.04, 563, August 29, minutes 284-285; September 17, minute 291; October 8 1889,
minute 298; January 23, minute 317; February 27 1890, minute 328. Ibid., 221, Letter October
2; November 19 1889; January 31 1890. Ibid., 221, Letters July 30, August 19 and September 10
1890; June 8; July 14; September 12 1891.
59 For instance, the conference disqualified L. Scharlach twice, yet both times he fought his
way back in.
2.3. An evaluation of the first seven years of the Continental
Conference
The interdependence between the shipping conferences dividing North
Atlantic passenger traffic into three sub-markets to raise prices, fix com-
missions or implement conference rules governing the network of agents
undermined the stability of the Continental Conference. The cartel mana-
ged to prevent rate wars in other sub-markets from spreading to the conti-
nent, yet these prevented the lines from significantly raising fares to avoid
continental passengers from taking alternative routes. With their foothold
in Hamburg, the British lines managed to maintain the upper hand. The
HAPAG’s efforts to neutralize this competition in its home port backfired
and also affected the internal cohesion between Continental lines. The lack
of an efficient means of detecting and discouraging cheating on the agree-
ments, especially those regulating sales through the migrant agent network,
hampered the efficiency of the cartel. Instead of becoming more transpa-
rent, transactions became even more corrupt. Where violations of the agre-
ement were too difficult to prove, members made sure they were able to
cheat on them as well, encouraging abuses. Most evidence of cheating was
collected by companies’ personnel and private detectives. Yet the cost of
detectives, who found it difficult to get their hands on affidavits, proved an
inefficient way to verify cheating. Agents hardly ever denounced colleagues.
Cheating was widespread and most agents were not irreproachable, which
removed the incentive to denounce. Shipping companies were not able to
implement the rules designed to eliminate differential treatment of custo-
mers by migrant agents. Neither could they prevent themselves from only
awarding facilities to some brokers and not others. When violations by
agents were recorded, the conference failed to use retaliation to deter repe-
tition. Fines were not high enough while lines refrained from disqualifying
most agents fearing that they could do more damage by working for non-
members 59. Members caught cheating also got away with a moderate fine
too easily, while Van der Toorn observed that this only had a slight effect on
the line’s position during the next renegotiations of the agreements. These
circumstances prevented the companies from raising gross prepaid rates.
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60 Stigler (1961, p. 44-61).
The cost per passenger was approximately $10, yet taking cheating
through cheaper European cash orders, payment of extra commissions and
cuts on railroad rates into account, the HAL’s net prices can only have exce-
eded this cost slightly. These indirect price cuts varied according to the com-
petitive pressures causing net rates to be far less stable than the figure sho-
wing gross rates suggests. The conference failed to increase the Dutch line-
’s profits while, in the meantime, it invested heavily in its fleet. This worked
to the advantage of the agents and especially of the migrants. Extra com-
missions were often returned to passengers to enable agents to increase
their sales. Hence migrants enjoyed better and faster services at rates barely
covering costs.
3. POOLING THE TRAFFIC, THE TONNAGE CLAUSE
AND THE IMPACT ON CONFERENCE AGREEMENTS
Fixing market shares was the most efficient method of combating secret
price cutting 60. The initial years of the Continental Conference convinced
FIGURE 1
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61 The lines contributed a fixed amount per passenger transported from these territories
which was then divided into shares at the end of the year. The CGT did remain in the New York
Conference adhering to the rules and adapting the rates in accordance with the members’ inte-
rest. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 221, Letter January 29 1892 and ibid., 563, April 1 1892, minute 537.
members of the need to reduce the competitive pressures to control both
agent networks and transport fares. Albert Ballin, manager of the HAPAG,
which suffered most of the instability, became the driving force behind the
expansion of agreements. Core members divided the market into shares and
used compensation schemes to balance shortages or excesses. To reduce
external price cutting, agreements were made with other lines to divide the
North-Atlantic market geographically. Although simultaneously the
American anti-trust movement gained momentum, shipping lines felt pro-
tected by the knowledge that American jurisdiction did not extend to inter-
national waters. This belief vanished midway through the 1890s, yet did not
affect conference negotiations during the period analyzed here.
3.1. The formation of the Nord-Atlantischer Dampfer-Linien
Verband
Negotiations for a westbound pool between RSL, HAL, NGL and HAPAG
started early in 1890. As CGT refused to join these talks, the members con-
sidered France, Switzerland and Italy as special territories for which they
organized a separate «Money-Pool» 61. The situation in Hamburg made the
inclusion of the British lines highly desirable, if not indispensable. Market
shares were based on the number of continental steerage passengers carried
in the previous decade from ports north of Cadiz to the US and Canada,
giving the HAL a share of 8 per cent, RSL 13.5 per cent, NGL 39.7 per cent
and HAPAG 24.8 per cent. A separate contract with the British lines limited
their share to 14 per cent. The percentage participation could be altered
depending on changes in tonnage of vessels employed by either more fre-
quent use or the introduction of new vessels. Companies which exceeded
their percentage had to compensate the lines which fell short with a fixed
amount per passenger which depended on the ocean fare. To limit these
compensations, members with a surplus during the year would raise their
rates to allow companies short of their share to book passengers at more
profitable prices instead of having to lower theirs. Gross rates and agent
commissions were fixed; anywhere between 6 and 20 Marks in Europe, $2
to $5 in the US. Members agreed that prepaid gross rates should, as far as
possible, be equal to European cash rates. No commission was allowed on
overland European transport which was limited to 300 popular departure
points. All members paid high deposits as a disincentive for lines to drop
out of the agreement. The contract was valid for four years. Only if altera-
tions proposed by two members or more were objected to, did a company
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62 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 580, Copy of contract «Nord-Atlantische Dampfer-Linien Verband»
January 19 1892.
63 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Letter December 20 1891.
64 Both were the result of a failed attempt by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to divert
part of freight and passengers traffic from New York to Philadelphia in the 1870s. The Ameri-
can Line sailed under the American flag, the RSL under the Belgian one, because of the high
extra costs which entailed sailing under the American flag. See Flayhart (1998, pp. 127-135
and 2000, pp. 15-62, 91-112), Safford (1985, pp. 53-81). In this text, when mentioning the Bri-
tish lines we refer to the lines managing a service from British soil, thus including the Ameri-
can Line.
have the right to withdraw from the agreement 62. As observed by Van den
Toorn, there was a lot of apprehension among members regarding the out-
come:
No one knows what the pool will bring and why HAPAG was so com-
pliant with the NGL. Possibly it is a conspiracy to destroy us and the
RSL, however I’d rather believe that both urgently need money and want
to clear out the steerage business from innumerable abuses, being weig-
hed down by the restless actions of agents, or should we say parasites 63.
The contract shows that the members learned from the weaknesses of
previous agreements. The quotas warranted that rates would no longer be
cut to obtain a larger market share. Linking prepaid with cash rates had to
bring an end to the order-system. Efforts were made to fix rates for overland
travel and HAL’s Baltimore service was included. The duration of four years
without notice put an end to the continuous renegotiations and constant
threats of withdrawal. Separate agreements neutralized competition from
CGT and British lines.
3.2. The British-Jewish Hamburg Connection: the conference’s
Achilles Heel
According to Van den Toorn, the collaboration of the British lines had
been bought dearly, yet internal division among the members of the British
Conference, which by then numbered thirteen members, delayed the sig-
ning of the contract. Moreover, the Cunard Line, in particular, distrusted the
true intentions of the German lines. The American Line which, together
with the RSL formed the International Navigation Company, served as plat-
form for the negotiations 64. The verbal agreement which was to be enforced
in February 1892 remained pending. Two months later the lines went ahead
without the National and Cunard Line for a three-month trial period. They
jointly increased rates to unprecedented levels. Yet with Cunard and
National lines quoting $19 and $15 respectively via Hamburg, while the
HAPAG’s lowest rate was $25, the German line was forced to pay a secret
TORSTEN FEYS
194
65 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, April 1 1982, minute 541; ibid., 222, Letters May 11 and 27 1892.
66 Ibid., 221, Letters of July 1 and 15 1891. Two years later the German government put the
border health control stations under the supervision of the German lines. See Wüstenbecker
(2003, pp. 223-236).
67 Ibid., 580, Contract between HAPAG and Vereinigung Hamburgischer Passagier-Expe-
dienten June 1 1892.
68 Ibid., 222, Letters June 22, July 12 and August 5 1892.
69 Murken (1922, p. 14).
70 At first the HAL directors opposed doing business with migrant brokers via Hamburg and
Bremen, fearing that it would promote the Hamburg route to the detriment of Rotterdam. When,
as anticipated, HAPAG found a way to bypass the brokers it would be hard to reorganize the
overland journey of migrants directly to Rotterdam.
extra commission of $3.5 to its agents to reach their pool share 65. Whatever
scheme Ballin put together to increase profits for his shipping company, the
money ended up in any pocket but his own. He reached special agreements
with agents on the Prussian-Russian boarder and the Jewish Aid Committee
of Berlin and lobbied the German government to pass laws putting an end
to the Hamburg brokers’ business 66. It forced the Hamburg Agents’
Association to negotiate a new three-year pool agreement, setting minimum
rates for all lines for which they booked. Fixed commissions on cash pas-
sengers were pooled by the agents» association. A clearing house controlled
the authenticity and validity of all prepaid tickets to prevent evasion from
the pool through order-tickets. The margin between British indirect services
and the cheapest direct HAPAG service was reduced to two Marks 67.
Overall, the pool produced satisfactory results and was extended to the eas-
tbound steerage business 68. When everything seemed to be falling into
place, cholera broke out in Hamburg disrupting traffic for six months.
When business resumed, both westbound and eastbound pools were
extended until the end of 1893 and rate agreements were reached with the
British lines. In the meantime, due to the crisis in Hamburg, Jewish
migrant brokers strengthened their position in other continental ports.
Letting the brokers increase their influence in Rotterdam exposed the HAL
to difficulties regarding indirect migration through England which HAPAG
tried to control without success. Yet, as Murken underlined, some migrant
brokers became more powerful than the shipping companies due to the
internal rivalry between lines which the pool did not bring to an end 69.
Because of the ability of these brokers to direct migrants via certain routes,
even if it meant extra travel and extra costs, the HAL preferred to see them
settle in Rotterdam than in Antwerp. Moreover, it would promote the direct
route through the Dutch port instead of via Hamburg which was too dan-
gerous to depend on 70. If the pool fell apart, the brokers were an asset in
assuring part of the migrant flow to Rotterdam.
Because of the continuing distrust between the Continental lines and,
more especially, the failure to include all British lines, the brokers regained
special facilities from the lines which corrupted the market. HAL gave
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71 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 222, Letters March 17, 27, April 7, May 29 and July 14 1893.
72 The ship Red Sea arrived with many sick passengers and was quarantined, creating sig-
nificant costs. An estimated forty passengers were deported at the shipowner’s expense, as Ame-
rican law prescribed. This experience appeared to have deterred the agents from renewing their
attempt. Early in 1891 the HAL considered entering the money transfer market following the
example of RSL, NGL, White Star Line, Guion Line, HAPAG and NGL. HAPAG even opened its
own immigrant bank in Canal Street where Jewish brokers congregated. Ibid., Letters July 25
1891 and July 19 1893.
73 Murken (1922, pp. 80-86), Sicotte (1997, pp. 152-153).
Westbound Joint NDLV tonnage Passengers # Passengers per 1000 tons
1892 1 505 209 214 753 143
1893 2 123 899 211 656 99
1894 2 051 720 84 610 41
1895 2 114 212 127 111 60
Scharlach a special rebate of ten marks on cash rates which, added to higher
commissions in Europe, allowed him to undercut prepaid tickets by $5.
Scharlach was also at liberty to change the name on the ticket, omit the price
and was exempted from paying cancellation fees. This allowed him to specu-
late by writing out many orders when he expected prices to increase.
Furthermore, if he obtained better conditions from the British lines, HAL pas-
sengers could easily be cancelled and forwarded indirectly. Scharlach quickly
gained control over the HAL prepaid sales. When all British lines refused to
renew the pool agreement for 1894, a rate war seemed inevitable and the bro-
kers posed a very serious threat. Moreover, the Dutch and American authori-
ties started applying stricter border controls on HAL passengers because
Scharlach supplied a growing number of destitute migrants in poor health
and in need of assistance. The company withdrew all facilities from
Scharlach and retook control of the business 71. Together with other migrant
brokers who had been cast aside, Scharlach chartered a ship, completely
bypassing the lines. Shipping companies, for their part, increasingly moved
into the migrant banking and remittance market to put pressure on agents 72.
3.3. Remaining internal and external pressures and the outbreak
of a general rate war
Despite failing to neutralize the external pressures, the NDLV did impro-
ve cohesion among the members as joint action to regulate aspects of the
passenger business became more common. Yet two aspects of the agreement
still caused a lot of friction. Firstly, because of the tonnage clause, the lines
expanded their fleets, decreasing the capacity utilization of their ships 73. The
number of services, such as that provided by the NGL Roland Line, carrying
freight and steerage passengers at lower rates increased, which encouraged
cheating. HAPAG converted sections of cattle steamers to carry the mini-
mum amount of migrants. To make the tonnage count for the recalculation
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74 HAL paid $3,848 extra commission the first nine months of 1892. From March till July
1893 the amount reached $9,179 and $12,739 for the following six months. GAR, HAL, 318.04,
222, Letters March 20 and July 14 1893.
75 Ibid., 563, January 4, minutes 669-672; March 30 and April 4 1894, minutes 717-739 and
ibid., 223, Letters April 1894.
76 Ibid., 223-226, Letters March 10 1893; January 18 and April 20 1894.
of their market share, companies needed to book fifty passengers wes-
tbound and fifteen eastbound. When it was feared that the quota was not
going to be met, passengers could obtain «last minute deals». HAL secretly
booked passengers at prices as low as $5 net, while HAPAG even transpor-
ted some free of charge. Instead of reducing overcapacity, the conference
encouraged it with this clause and incited lines to cut rates. In 1895 the
lines lowered the increase in market share attributed to a rise in tonnage
before eliminating the tonnage clause in 1899. The fact that the lines only
signed a one-year instead of four-year contract, due to the non inclusion of
all the British lines, constituted a second pressure point. This caused long
annual discussions about market shares. During the initial years of the pool,
members did not fully trust the system of fixed shares and it was felt that
falling short could too often result in a reduction of the quota. Therefore
lines paid extra commissions to make sure that quotas were filled, if not
surpassed. This practice was reinforced because the rate agreements with
British lines did not decrease the keen rivalry and violations persisted 74.
Anticipating a pool agreement including the British lines which the
directors negotiated in Europe, the head-agents of the Continental lines
introduced «city rules» in New York, limiting ticket sales to joint company
offices. Agents tried to stay in business by attempting to direct all their
clients to the British lines. Van den Toorn was confident that the short term
loss would largely be compensated by the long term gain of putting an end
to the abuses and allowing the overland agencies to increase their sales 75.
Continental lines offered to withdraw completely from the British eas-
tbound steerage market and to give up 12 per cent of the continental traf-
fic. British lines, for their part, would not quote prices below the lowest
price of pool members and cede a share of the Scandinavian market. The
lines then seemed to settle for a counterproposal consisting of the
Continental lines’ withdrawal from British and Scandinavian markets while
yielding only 6 per cent of continental traffic. Yet again, lack of unity among
the British lines prevented the signing of the contract 76. As negotiations
proved unsuccessful, the Continental lines decided to start a rate war to
force the British to a consensus. The fact that the market had collapsed
because of the American financial crisis spurred the decisions. To limit the
losses caused by rate wars, lines usually waited for recessions to force the
weakest companies to make concessions.
All the agents in New York were reinstated and paid extra commissions
ranging from $2 to $5. The Continental lines opened a regular service to
PREPAID TICKETS TO THE NEW WORLD: THE NEW YORK CONTINENTAL CONFERENCE...
197
77 Ibid., Letter April 24 1894.
78 In the meantime some Continental and British lines had opened direct services from Italy
to catch a share of the booming market. The NGL and HAPAG attacked the Scandinavian market,
the latter reopening a direct service.
79 Murken does not explain why the American Line was exempted from the restrictions impo-
sed by the Board of Trade impeding foreign lines from transporting westbound steerage pas-
sengers from British ports. The agreement between the American Line and NDLV was reached
at a conference in Cologne. GAR, HAL, 318.04, 223, Letter April 27 1894.
80 GAR, HAL, 318.04, 563, July 26, 1894, minutes 775-777. Ibid., 223, Letters May 11 and
September 5 1894.
81 Ibid., June 19, minute 843, August 13, minutes 861-87 and September 4, minute 875.
Queenstown alternating sailings on the eastbound route, quoting net rates
of $10 and increased sailings to and from Southampton. The British lines
used the orders of migrant brokers in Continental ports to undercut
Continental fares, quoting $15 from Rotterdam to New York 77. The war also
spread to the Mediterranean and Scandinavian markets 78. Improved colla-
boration between the Continental lines as a result of the pool strengthened
their position against the British lines whose collaboration was still based
on less complex rate agreements, which weakened their unity. The
American Line joined forces with the NDLV lines allowing these to attack
the British on their internal westbound market 79. For Continental traffic the
NDLV initially responded to the price cuts of the British lines with extra
commissions instead of lowering rates. This had the advantage of binding
agents to the lines and prevented agents and brokers from speculating by
writing out large numbers of prepaid blanks to be used when prices incre-
ased. Yet, it was impossible to prevent Continental passengers from taking
advantage of the low British rates quoted by the NDLV lines and returning
indirectly to Europe. Moreover, the British lines increased their share of the
westbound continentals and a drastic cut of $8 on prepaid and eastbound
Continental rates followed 80.
The slump in the market combined with the rate war put a lot of strain
on both the pool and on the British lines with the Guion and National Line
being forced out of the passenger business. In 1895 negotiations resumed
and the lines agreed to stop the war and jointly raise fares. If both parties
came to an agreement, agents and brokers would no longer be able to play
out the rivalry to their advantage. Fearing exclusion from the market, the
principal American agents formed the New York City Agent Association,
headed by A. Falck, to discuss a suitable arrangement for agents and ship-
ping lines. Agents agreed to abide by all conference rules and to stop dra-
wing orders on European houses in exchange for a guarantee of a minimum
amount of business and protection from the lines against the abuses of non-
conference agents. The Hamburg brokers also signed a new agreement with
the Continental and British lines to put an end to the abuses originating
from the German port 81. The long-awaited pool agreement finally materia-
lized, limiting the British lines’ share to 6 per cent of Continental traffic,
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82 Ibid., 223, Letter September 15 1985.
while Continental lines withdrew from the British and Scandinavian mar-
kets. It made it possible to impose conference rules on agents and brokers,
which had important repercussions on transatlantic steerage fares. As the
figure below illustrates, the pool agreement allowed Continental lines to
increase prepaid prices significantly in 1892. Yet discord among the British
lines delayed further increases and forced the companies to pay out high
commissions, which cut into their profits. Prices plummeted during the war
only to recuperate when negotiations resumed. When the extended pool
agreement was signed, prices reached unprecedented levels. Compared to
1885, HAL prepaid prices had doubled, rising from $17 to $34. The agree-
ment would set new standards for fixing ocean fares for the following two
decades 82.
FIGURE 
NEW YORK PREPAID FARES OF CONTINENTAL LINES 1890-1896
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Passenger conferences, prepaid fares, profit distribution and migration costs:
a complex story
The widespread networks of migrant agents on both sides of the Atlantic
clearly undermined shipowners’ ability to fix prices for transatlantic trans-
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port. Agents favored an unstable market because the keener the competition
between the lines, the higher their commissions and the more facilities they
obtained to increase their sales. The lack of a common interest between
migrant agents and shipowners forced the latter to rely on conference rules
to police the former. Shipping conferences which regulated passenger trans-
port were as much a means of horizontal integration regulating competi-
tion between shipping companies as they were a means of vertical integra-
tion to gain control over the agent network. The analysis of the New York
Continental Conference illustrates that it took the members a decade to find
a workable equilibrium. A lasting agreement could only be reached once
members had neutralized the competition of non conference Continental
lines in their home ports. Yet, the distrust between members prevented
them from making longstanding arrangements. The constant renegotiations
on ocean rate differentials and the fact that fixed rates pushed the competi-
tion increasingly towards new and improved services, railroad rates and the
tying of migrant brokers and agents to a line, impeded the conference from
relieving the internal pressures between lines. Such internal pressures were
intensified by the external pressures.
The success of the Continental Conference depended on the imposition
of similar arrangements on the other sub-markets into which the North
Atlantic passenger market was subdivided; the British-Scandinavian and
Mediterranean. The conference agreements between the British lines con-
cluded in the late1860’s, the government protection of the home market
from foreign competition, and the strong foothold in the Continental mar-
ket via Hamburg allowed British companies to hold a dominant position on
the North Atlantic passenger market. Continental lines therefore depended
on the collaboration of the British lines to fix continental fares, commis-
sions and impose rules on the migrant agent network to regulate sales. The
lack of harmony between lines allowed migrant brokers to play off the
rivalry to their advantage, increasing their control over the market.
European migrant brokers opened branch offices in the US to exploit the
price difference between European cash and American prepaid tickets,
undercutting the shipping lines on the American market by issuing their
own orders. Instead of making the market more transparent, all kinds of
abuses concealing price cuts expanded during the first seven years of the
Continental Conference. Cheating on conference agreements was too hard
to detect and no effective means were put into place to deter lines and
agents from doing so.
By dividing the market into shares with the formation of the NDLV, the
Continental lines neutralized the internal incentives to cheat on the agree-
ments and greatly improved the harmony among the members. The increa-
sed collaboration helped to increase the pressures on the British lines to
reach a compromise. The lack of similar agreements between the members
of the other sub-markets would subsequently allow the Continental lines to
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take the lead in the North-Atlantic steerage market. When these British lines
joined the pool agreement, the Continental lines finally managed to impose
themselves on the migrant agents, raise the gross rates and limit the price
cuts from which the purchasers of transatlantic ocean passage had benefi-
ted especially. This significantly increased profits on steerage passenger
sales of steamship lines, while augmenting the cost for migrants to cross the
Atlantic. Before the agreement, excluding the lows of $10 during rate wars,
HAL’s net prices varied between $15 and $20. In 1896 the rate reached $32
which would set the standard for the next decades.
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APPENDIX 1
The New York Conferences, members and ports from which they
operated 1885-1895
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APPENDIX 2
Prepaid rates in dollars of the Continental lines» New York services
HAPAG HAPAG NGL NGL
HAL RSL HAPAG Express Union NGL Express Roland
30/4/1885 18 20 20 20 22
15/5/1885 17 20 20 20 22
28/7/1885 19.5 22.5 22.5 22.5 24.5
10/11/1885 22 25 25 25
01/03/1886 22 25 25 23 25 27
02/08/1886 22 15 25 23 25 27
03/08/1886 12 15 15 13 15 17
16/04/1887 21 23 24 22 discontinued 25
01/12/1887 20.5 22.5 23.5 22 discontinued 26
01/02/1889 20.5 22 23.5 26 22 23 26
15/10/1889 21 22 23.5 26 22 discontinued 26
14/05/1890 19 20 21.5 24 20.5 discontinued 24
07/03/1892 22 23 25 27 23 25 27
09/04/1892 26.5 27.5 27.5 30 25 27.5 30
05/05/1892 24.5 27.5 27.5 30 25 27.5 30
22/06/1892 24.5 27.5 24.5 27 22 27.5 30
01/07/1892 21.5 25 24.5 27 22 27.5 30
04/09/1892 21.5 25 24.5 27 22 27.5 30
27/10/1892 24 25 24.5 27 22 27.5 30
01/03/1893 30 32 32 35 30 32 35
04/04/1893 25 27.5 27.5 30 24 30 32.5 25
13/07/1893 25 27.5 25 27.5 21.5 30 32.5 25
03/09/1893 25 27.5 27.5 30 24 30 32.5 25
02/08/1894 17 21 27.5 30 24 30 32.5 25
03/08/1894 17 21 27.5 30 24 22.5 25 18
04/08/1894 17 21 22.5 25 19 22.5 25 18
21/08/1894 17 21 22.5 25 17 22.5 25 18
03/11/1894 17 16 22.5 25 17 22.5 25 18
27/03/1895 22.5 25 30 32.5 25 30 32.5 25
05/04/1895 25 25 30 32.5 25 30 32.5 25
11/04/1895 25 25 27.5 32.5 25 30 32.5 25
13/04/1895 25 27.5 27.5 32.5 25 30 32.5 25
09/09/1895 25 27.5 27.5 32.5 25 30 32.5 30
14/11/1895 25 27.5 30 35 27.5 35 37.5 32.5
01/01/1896 25 27.5 30 35 27.5 32.5 35 27.5
06/01/1896 22.5 27.5 30 35 27.5 32.5 35 27.5
08/01/1896 22.5 25 30 35 27.5 32.5 35 27.5
12/02/1896 22.5 25 30 35 27.5 34 36.5 29.5
18/02/1896 27 29.5 30 35 27.5 34 36.5 29.5
26/02/1896 27 29.5 31.5 36.5 29.5 34 36.5 29.5
13/03/1896 31.5 29.5 31.5 36.5 29.5 34 36.5 29.5
19/031896 34 29.5 31.5 36.5 29.5 34 36.5 29.5
21-3-1896 34 29.5 31.5 36.5 31.5 34 36.5 31.5
